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Abstract This paper addresses the problem of efficient
intrusion detection for mobile devices via correlating the
user’s location and time data. We developed two statistical
profiling approaches for modeling the normal spatio–tem-
poral behavior of the users: one based on an empirical
cumulative probability measure and the other based on the
Markov properties of trajectories. An anomaly is detected
when the probability of a particular (location, time) evo-
lution matching the normal behavior of a given user
becomes lower than a certain threshold, determined by
controlling the recall rate of the model of the normal user’s
behavior. We used compression techniques to reduce pro-
cessing overhead while maintaining high accuracy. Our
evaluation based on the Reality Mining and Geolife data
sets shows that the proposed system is capable of detecting
a potential intrusion within 15 min and with 94 %
accuracy.
Keywords Mobile security  Trajectory analysis 
Data reduction
1 Introduction
Recent technological advancements caused a huge increase
in the use of mobile devices. Smart phones, notebooks, and
iPads come with many capabilities including email, text
messaging, gaming, web browsing, navigation, and
recording pictures/videos. These devices store a lot of
personal information and, if stolen, loss of control over the
data may be more important than the loss of the smart
mobile device.
Some prior works on mobile device security have
focused on physical aspects and/or access control methods
(e.g., strong passwords, voice recognition [26], or finger-
prints [21]). However, such approaches do not protect the
private data on stolen devices in the post-authentication
state. Today’s smart devices are already equipped with
tools that allow us to obtain vast amount of data about user
behavior, such as application usage logs. In addition, many
mobile devices are equipped with location identification
tools such as Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers,
which can be used to track locations in case of theft.
However, existing works using GPS-features to protect
mobile devices (e.g., GadgetTrak [12] and RecoveryCop
[25]) depend on the owner to report the theft, and it may
take hours before the owner realizes it, at which point
private data may have already been exploited. Even Laptop
Cop [23] requires user intervention to remotely/manually
delete the data on stolen devices.
Our main goal is to develop efficient techniques for
protecting data saved on mobile devices by detecting
anomalous spatio–temporal behavior as compared to the
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regular motion patterns of the owners. A study performed
by Gonza´lez et al. [14] on 100,000 trajectories of anony-
mized mobile phone users whose positions were tracked for
a 6-month period has demonstrated that many individuals
tend to have small sets of locations that they visit fre-
quently (e.g. home, work, school) and tend to take the same
path when moving between locations. Observations Gon-
za´lez et al. [14] imply that the user’s presence at a certain
time in a certain location is predictable—hence, we can
utilize this to build a user profile which, in turn, can be
used to perform anomaly detection.
In a previous study [34], we used network access pat-
terns and file system activities on laptops to build a
behavioral model based on K-means clustering that per-
mitted attack detection with a latency of 5 min and an
accuracy of 90 %. In a recent work [35], we used users’
location information and trajectory data to build the profile
of smart phone users, and we were able to detect attacks
within 15 min with 81 % accuracy. This paper extends our
results [35] as follows:
1. We present an enhanced user model based on the
previously discussed spatio–temporal information and
trajectory data approach where we assumed a normal
distribution histogram for the user profile. We elim-
inated the low end of the distribution (lower than 10 %
values) during the detection analysis in order to
achieve 96 % detection accuracy.
2. We propose, implement, and compare two data
reduction techniques that enable us to reduce the
memory requirements by &90 % and consequently
reduce the processing time. Those techniques are the
Row-Merge algorithm, which combines adjacent rows
in our data structures and the MDLP algorithm, which
is an adaptation of an existing statistical technique [3]
to our settings.
3. We evaluated our techniques on an additional spatio–
temporal data set—Geolife [36–38].
In summary, this article makes the following main
contributions.
– We develop two statistical profiling approaches and
corresponding representations: one based on empirical
cumulative probability measure and the other based on
the Markov property, in order to model the normal
behavior of a user in a fixed time-window. An anomaly
is detected when the probability of a user window
reflecting a normal behavior falls below a threshold that
is determined by controlling the recall rate of the user’s
normal behavior.
– We present two techniques that reduce user profile
memory requirements while still allowing accurate
attack detection.
– We present a detailed experimental evaluation of the
proposed methodologies over two data sets, quantifying
the benefits of our approaches.
In the rest of this paper, Sect. 2 places the work in the
context of our system architecture and discusses the data
and feature extraction methods. Section 3 presents the
detail of the user profile representation and our anomaly-
based detection schemes. Section 4 presents the methods
used to reduce the size of the user profile data. Section 5
presents a comprehensive experimental evaluation of our
methods. Section 6 describes related work and Sect. 7
concludes the paper and indicates directions for future
work.
2 Preliminaries
We now give an overview of our system architecture,
followed by discussion of the properties of the data and
their use in feature extraction.
Our system for automatic generation of mobility
models and detection of spatio–temporal behavioral
anomalies is based on a client–server architecture utiliz-
ing cloud computing. Its main modules are (1) data col-
lection, (2) feature extraction, (3) user profile/model
building, (4) data reduction, and (5) anomaly detection.
The detection accuracy will be determined by which
anomalous behavior can be distinguished using such
models and considering other users’ models for anomaly
detection; Fig. 1 illustrates the integration of these mod-
ules into our system architecture, which consists of the
following sub-systems:
(ICS)—the information capturing system, which resides
on the mobile device, contains an application to track the
device location, register it periodically, and save it in a new
log file every T minutes. It also contains the feature
extraction module.
(IMS)—the information management system, which
collects the log-files from the ICS and resides on a com-
puter with higher performance and much looser power
consumption constraints than the mobile device. It is
responsible for building mobility models and performing
anomaly detection. Upon building the user model, the IMS,
possibly after the data reduction process, sends the user
model to the mobile device, allowing local detection of
attacks in the absence of wireless connection.
(RMS)—the response management system, which
resides on both the mobile device and the remote server
hosting the IMS. Upon receiving an alert, the RMS iden-
tifies the appropriate action to protect data on the mobile
device, for example, notifying the device owner, locking
the device, or automatically deleting private data.
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Our work focuses on the algorithms and implementa-
tions for the ICS and the IMS modules, since the RMS
consists of user-dependent actions to be executed upon
actual detection of an attack. Again, the rationale is to
maximize the extent to which the mobile devices them-
selves can detect the anomalous spatio–temporal behavior.
While the data structures representing the user motion are
built at the server, in the case of transient network failure,
classification can still be performed on the client using the
most recent transmitted matrix. Clearly, this may affect the
classification accuracy if the network connection is not
available for a prolonged period of time.
2.1 Mobility profiles
We now present our setup for the data collection and the
feature extraction modules.
2.1.1 Data collection
Motion traces are essential for model construction and
anomaly detection. To obtain them, motion monitoring
software needs to be developed to collect information
about each user’s motion patterns—that is, his spatio–
temporal data (along with the other user activities such as
file system access and network activities). These are saved
as trace files, to be sent to the IMS system periodically at
pre-determined intervals.
In our initial system implementation, we relied on the
fact that a number of researchers gathered vast amount of
motion traces and they are publicly available [11, 14, 27,
28, 38]. We note, however, that some of these traces were
collected for reasons different from ours, with different
experimental settings and requirements.
Our desiderata can be summarized by the following
properties, abbreviated as (LCF):
– longevity (L): collected for a long period of time,
continuously;
– consistency (C): collected at regular times (e.g., same
times daily); and
– high frequency (F): to support fast anomaly detection.
After analyzing the different available traces, two data
sets—Reality Mining data set [11] and Geolife [38]—
turned out to provide closest match for the (LCF)
properties.
The Reality Mining data set contains traces collected
over a 9-month period for over 100 users, consisting of
phone calls logs, locations identified by tower IDs and area
IDs, event logs, and device-specific data such as the device
specs. The collection interval ranged from a few seconds to
15 min, with an average of 2.5 min (except when the
mobile device was off) at regular time-instants daily.
The Geolife data set is a collection of GPS trajectories
for 178 users in a period of over 4 years. The data was
recorded with high frequency where 91 % of the trajec-
tories are logged every 1–5 seconds or every 5–10 meters
per point. With closer examination, we noticed that about
50 % of this data set is also compliant with the LCF
properties.
2.1.2 Feature extraction
Reality Mining data set: The traces have over 55 data
features capturing information about the users’ mobility,
activity, communication events, reporting time, and
device-specific information such as the MAC address and
the device maker. Since we focus on the spatio–temporal
and trajectory features, properties like user activity, device-
specific information, user communication style, and user
affiliation information were not considered.
Reality Mining data provides three values to represent a
location: cell tower ID, area ID, and area name. The cell
tower ID gives information associated with user’s loca-
tion—therefore, it is a source of information for the user’s
movement over time. However, the tower ID information
in the Reality Mining data set has no geographical coor-
dinate information, and since each physical location could
be associated with multiple tower IDs, we consider the
tower ID as unreliable feature. Thus, we have selected the
area ID to represent the location information in our study.
Area ID represents the physical location (Library, Office,

























Response management system (RMS)





Fig. 1 System architecture
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(ICS) itself or by the user when reporting new locations
such as home, office, restaurants, etc.
Our spatio–temporal analysis techniques depends on
extracting the following features from the Reality Mining
log:
1. (ui)—User ID;
2. (lj)—Location information, represented by the area ID
in the traces; and
3. (tk)—Timestamps of the data records in the trace.
Thus, our input data records are tuples of the form
(ui, lj, tk).
Geolife data set: These traces have a smaller number of
features—only seven of them, including the longitude,
latitude, and altitude information in addition to the date and
time information, and the transportation mode (car, bus,
walking, . . .).
We note that this data set was collected in 30 different
cities in China, United States, Korea, and Europe, and we
focused on the trajectories that were collected in same cities.
Examining the row data directed us to think that most
study users started at the location with 39.0–41.0,
115.5–117.5) coordinates and then moved to different
areas by bus, train, plane, or boat. This location represents
Beijing (China [31]). We focused on an area of
(138 9 110) square miles [24].
To utilize this data set, the GPS location information
needed to be mapped into an area ID, so that the structure is
similar to the Reality Mining data set representation. The
longitude and latitude information is provided by degrees,
with precision up to (0.000001). In the GPS system, at 39
latitude, any change on the longitude to the (±0.0001) digit
represents &8 m, while at the 116 longitude, the same
change in the altitude represents &7 m. Therefore, in this
data set, we rounded the coordinate numbers to the closest
fourth decimal digit and have each coordinate pair represent
an area ID, again having records/tuples of the form (ui, lj, tk).
3 Data models and anomaly detection
We developed two statistical profiling approaches in order
to model the normal behavior of a user in a fixed window.
Model #1 is based on the empirical cumulative probability
measure of location and time, while Model #2 is based on
the Markov transition property. In this section, we describe
each of them in detail.
3.1 Model #1: Location-in-time probability measure
In Model #1, for each user ui, we extract the location lj and
timestamp tk. For conciseness, we will sometimes neglect
notation for user ID when it is clear from the context.
3.1.1 Building the user profile
Since our goal is to detect attacks by detecting deviation
from the user’s normal behavior, the first step is to
develop a model of a user’s normal behavior based on
the set of locations that the user has visited during the
data collection period. To build the respective user pro-
files for each user in the data set, we divided the data
logs evenly into two consecutive data sets: model_data
(used for model construction) and test_data (used for
evaluation).
Utilizing the model_data, a user profile was constructed
as follows:
1. For each user ui, we extracted the distinct locations and
kept track of them in a list (Li).
2. We built a table of |Li| columns and NT rows to save
the location probability values, where NT stands for
the number of minutes in a day.
3. We calculated the probability Probi(tk, lj) that repre-
sents the fraction of time in the model_data in which
the user ui was at location lj at time tk, where
1 B j B |Li|, and 1 B k B NT. Recall that at any given
time tk, the user ui should be at some unique location lj
from the location list Li
8tk 2 NT ; 9 lj 2 Li where Probiðtk; ljÞ[ 0 ð1Þ
4. We extracted from the user distinct location list Li the
user’s common locations list (UCLi), which consists
of locations that the user has visited more than 1 %
of the time during the data collection period. All
locations that have been visited less than 1 % of the
time will be saved in the Infrequent list (IFi) in order
to be able to delete all related records from the
model_data, and the respective columns from the user
profile.








Probiðtk; ljÞ\0:01 then lj 2 IFi
We selected the value of 1 % based on the study per-
formed by Bayir et al. [4], which reported that indi-
viduals spend 79–85 % of their time in small number
of locations (2–8), and less than 15 % of their time in
large number of locations that they have visited only
less than 1 % of the time. We observed that the frac-
tion |IFi|/|Li| can be significant, and hence, keeping
track only of UCLi is a first step toward reducing the
storage costs.
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5. We eliminated the least visited locations from the
profile table, and obtained a final user profile size of
|UCLi| B |Li| columns and NT rows.
6. We create a discrete probability distribution by
counting visits to the common locations and then





LOC-IN-TIMEiðtk; ljÞ ¼ 1 ð2Þ
Figure 2 shows an example user profile represented as a
two-dimensional matrix with (NT 9 |UCLi|) elements.
Rows (tk) correspond to the minutes of the day (12:00
AM, 12:01 AM, . . ., 11:59 PM) and columns (lj)
correspond to locations (l1, l2, l3, l4, l5). Each cell in the
user profile represents the weighted probability LOC-IN-
TIMEi(tk, lj).
For example, this user profile shows that the user has
never been in locations l2, l4, or l5 at 12:00 AM during
the data collection period, while 4 % of the data collec-
tion time he was at location l1. Please note that while
reading the timestamp in the mobility trace, we consider
the hour and the minute values only; therefore, each row
in the user profile represents the minute of the day plus
59 seconds.
3.1.2 Anomaly detection
The anomaly detection process is responsible for receiving
streams of user mobility data, comparing them with the
user profile, and identifying an anomaly (potential theft of
the mobile device).
Our anomaly detection scheme falls into the class of
statistical methods [7] which are based on the assumption
that normal data instances occur in a high probability
measure of the stochastic model while anomalies occur in
the low probability region of the stochastic model. Our
scheme is a nonparametric collective anomaly detection
model, where the probability values are extracted from the
traces and an anomaly represents an unusual sequence of
data.
The first step of our collective anomaly detection
scheme is to randomly select 100 samples ðS1; S2; S3; . . .;
Sm; . . .; S100Þ from the test_data set, for which the time
span is T minutes as shown in Fig. 3.
A random sample Sm of time span T corresponds to a
contiguous sequence of records:
ðui; lj; tkÞ; ðui; lj1 ; tk1Þ; . . .; ðui; ljx ; tkxÞ; . . .; ðui; ljn ; tknÞ satis-
fying these three conditions:
– tk  tk1 ; . . .;  tkx ; . . .;  tkn
– ðtkn  tkÞ T
– ðtknþ1  tkÞ[ T
The number of records per sample varies among sam-
ples due to the variation in data collection interval.
For each sample Sm, we define the empirical cumulative
probability PSm of the records in the sequence using the
probability distribution table established during the profile
building phase and based on the model_data representative





As an example, let us consider the sample S1 as shown
in Fig. 4. To calculate the PS1 value, we check the user
profile illustrated in Fig. 2 and we extract the values for








0.04 0 0.011 0 0
0.04 0 0.01 0 0
0.03 0.01 0.02 0 0
0.032 0 0.021 0 0
0.029 0 0.021 0 0
0.04 0 0.019 0 0
12:00 PM 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.03
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Fig. 3 Example of dividing the test_data set into 100 test samples
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PS1 ¼ LOC-IN-TIMEið12 : 00AM; l1Þ
þ LOC-IN-TIMEið12 : 01AM; l1Þ
þ LOC-IN-TIMEið12 : 02AM; l1Þ
þ LOC-IN-TIMEið12 : 03AM; l1Þ
þ LOC-IN-TIMEið12 : 04AM; l1Þ
PS1 ¼ 0:04 þ 0:04 þ 0:03 þ 0:032 þ 0:038 ¼ 0:18
We calculate the PSm values, essential for defining the
user trust value, for all 100 samples as illustrated (cf.
Fig. 4) similarly.
We are now ready to relate the time span of a sample
derived from the model data to the detection delay:
Definition 1 Detection delay (T) is the shortest length
(measured in time) of the trace generated by the mobile
device that would allow the system to distinguish among
users with an acceptable accuracy rate.
The detection delay T equals the time span of the user
samples discussed above and the incoming data stream
windows need to cover also the same time span T.
Definition 2 Trust value (Ptrust) for Model #1 is the
empirical cumulative probability of samples of span T that
represents a confidence interval of 90 % based on the user
profile. All data stream windows with cumulative proba-
bility less than Ptrust are considered attacks.
Attacks are detected via mismatches between the data
stream windows and the samples conforming to the normal
user behavior, yielding an attack detection delay T. When
the empirical cumulative probability of a specific data
stream window drops below the Trust value (Ptrust), our
system concludes that the mobile device is used by
someone other than its owner, or what we call in this paper,
the device is under attack.
Definition 3 False acceptance rate (FAR) is the per-
centage of the attack data stream windows that are
accepted by the system as normal user behavior.
Definition 4 False rejection rate (FRR) is the percentage
of the user’s normal data stream windows that are identi-
fied by the system as an attack.
We focus on the FAR and FRR values—an ideal system
should have FAR = FRR = 0. Yet errors are possible
since human mobility traces can deviate from the calcu-
lated profile from time to time. Therefore, our goal is to
associate with every user a Ptrust value that strikes a good
balance between the FAR and FRR values.
In the example illustrated in Fig. 4, the smallest PSm
value equals zero; therefore, setting Ptrust also equals to the
smallest PSm value, implies that the system will accept
every incoming stream window and treat as acceptable user
behavior. Subsequently, in this case, we obtain FAR =
100 % and FRR = 0 %.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between precision and
recall as examined in our data set, where (x =)recall =
1 - FRR and (y =)precision = 1 - FAR. We observe that
the high recall, say 0.9, implies a small FRR (0.1) and large
FAR (0.8) values. As we decrease the recall, the FRR
values increase, for example, for recall = 0.7, we get
FRR = 0.3 and correspondingly FAR = 0.6.
Our heuristic starts with the observation that the histo-
gram of the cumulative probabilities for the 100 traces of
each user is close to the histogram for user u92 as shown in
Fig 6. Next, we choose a Ptrust value for each user that
guarantees FRR B 10 % which corresponds to accepting
90 % of the user’s normal behavior based on the trace
samples. If we consider PSm to be a random window
cumulative probability, then the range from the determined
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PSm = 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0

















Recall = 1 - FRR
Fig. 5 The relationship between precision and recall
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PSm . Intuitively, for FRR B 10 %, the Ptrust score can
maximally discover behavior anomalies (corresponding the
true attack) with a very small false alarm rate.
After calculating the Ptrusti for each user, the anomaly
detection process can start, formally described by Algorithm 1.
3.2 Model #2: Markov-based transition probability
matrix
Model #2 is a collective anomaly detection scheme that
makes use of them Markov chain stationary property. In our
model, states correspond to tuples of the form (ui, tk, lj). The
Markov property in our context means that the probability of
a user ui moving to location lj0 at time tk does depend on
previous location lj visited by ui in the model_data.
Conceptually, the user’s location–duration trace is
divided into sequences, that is, trajectories. Each trajectory
consists of a start point (SSP), a number of intermediate
points, and an end point SEP, and may differ semantically
due to the notion of stopping time TSTP which is defined as
the time interval during which the user is stationary. Based
on observations from other researchers [32], we use
TSTP = 30 min.
3.2.1 Building user profile
For Model #2, the user profile is a three-dimensional table
LOC-TIME-MOVEi. Each entry in this table, LOC-TIME-
MOVEiðtk; lj0 ; ljÞ, represents the weighted probability of the
user ui moving from location lj to location lj0 at time tk.
Figure 7 represents the state diagram corresponding to a
trace of user sequences starting at location l1 at time t1. The
nodes stand for the identified (locations,time) tuples while
the edges represent moves from a location to another
weighted by the probability of the transition. Note that for
conciseness, we did not store the time information in the
nodes of the state graph, but are showing it in the rightmost
column.
This state graph illustrates that if the user ui was at
location l1 at time t1, there is 50 % probability that the user
will stay at the same location l1 at time t2, 20 % probability
to go to location l2, 25 % probability to go to location l3,
and 5 % probability to go to location l4, while the user has
never travelled to locations l5 or l6 from location l1 at time
t2 during the data collection period. At time t3, the user who
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Fig. 7 State graph representing the user sequences when the user
starts at location l1 at time t1
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stay at location l1, and 30 % probability to go to location l3,
and so on.
To build the user profile utilizing the three-dimensional
data structure, we perform the following tasks:
1. Read the model_data set.
2. Build a list of the user’s distinct locations (Li).
3. Build and initialize a three-dimensional matrix of
size (NT 9 |Li| 9 |Li|) where each 2-D plane
represents a different starting location for a
trajectory.
4. Identify the first record in the data set and keep track
of its timestamp t1 and location l1. This location
becomes the Starting Point, SSP, for this trajectory.
Increase the frequency value and calculate the
probability value Probi(t1, l1, l1).
5. Read the time stamp and the location of the next
record t2,
– If t2 - t1 C TSTP, then this record will be
considered a new SSP for a new trajectory, and
the previous point is an SEP for the previous
trajectory. Go to Step 5.
– If t2 - t1 \ TSTP, we increase the frequency
value by one and calculate the probability value
Probi(t2, l2, l1).
6. We repeat the task #4 until we reach the end of the
data set.
7. Create the UCLi list by eliminating all locations that
the user visited less than 1 % of the time, (same
reason as indicated in Sect. 3.1).
8. Create the new user profile with the NT rows, |UCLi|
columns, and |UCLi| depth.
9. Replace the probability value, Probiðtk; lj0 ; ljÞ, in each
cell in the new user profile with the weighted
probability value, LOC-TIME-MOVEiðtk; lj0 ; ljÞ.
10. The final user profile will have the sum of each row in
each starting location matrix equals to one.
8lj0 2 UCLi and 8k 2 NT
XUCLi
j¼1
LOC-TIME-MOVEiðtk; lj0 ; ljÞ ¼ 1
ð4Þ
Upon completing this process for all the records in
the model_data set, the user profile will be produced
as a three-dimensional matrix as shown in Fig. 8. The
rows represent the minutes of the day where each
minute is a row, the columns represent the locations
from the UCLi list, and the depth represents the
starting locations from the UCLi.
For example, if we consider the user trajectory represented
in the Fig. 7, the associated user profile would be the one
shown in Fig. 8. In this example, the user starts at location l1 at
time t1. The cell (t2, l1, l1) indicates the weighted probability
value for the user to be at location l1 at time t2, when he was at
location l1 in the previous record, LOC-TIME-MOVE-
i(t2, l1, l1) = 50 %, and the cell (t2, l2, l1) indicates the
probability value for the user goes to location l2 at time t2,
when he was at location l1 in the previous record, LOC-TIME-
MOVEi(t2, l2, l1) = 20 %, and so on.
3.2.2 Anomaly detection
The anomaly detection process for Model #2 follows the












































































Fig. 8 Mobility model for user
ui (Model #2)
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where we focus on the evaluation of P0trust; FAR
0, and FRR0
to identify the system ability to detect attack. The calcu-
lation for FAR0 and FRR0 is the same as explained in Sect.
3.1.2, but the computation of trust values P0trust for each
user is different.
Definition 5 The trust value ðP0trustÞ for Model #2 is the
trace joint probability value that represents a confidence
interval of 90 % based on the user profile. All traces with
probability value less than P0trust are considered attacks.
For Model #2 and since we capture the user movement,
where the probability of the user to be in any location at
any time is highly dependent on the previous location at the
previous point of time, we calculate the Markov sequence
probability value for each trace sample (Sm) rather than the




LOC-TIME-MOVEiðtk; lj0 ; ljÞ: ð5Þ
The joint probability value is the product of the probabilities
of all records in the trace sample Sm, as indicated in the LOC-
TIME-MOVE table. Equation 5 shows that if any record in
the sequence has a probability of zero, which corresponds to
the fact that the user has never moved between these two
locations at this time before, the whole trace will be con-
sidered an attack because the P0Sm ¼ 0. To reduce the penalty
for deviation from the normal path, we introduce the concept
of Trace Threat Level (TL), which represents the percentage
of the records in the trace that has no representation in the
user profile. Thus, if LOC-TIME-MOVEiðtk; lj0 ; ljÞ ¼ 0, we
eliminate this value from the calculation of the trace joint
probability value and increase the Threat Level value by one.
We use a threat level threshold of TLtrust = 10 % of the total
records in the trace, based on empirical analysis.
As an example, Fig. 9 shows two paths; the solid curve
represents the normal path in the user’s profile and the
dashed curve represents the currently detected trajectory. In
this example, the user profile indicates that when the
starting point at time t1 is location l2, the normal path of
duration T is l2 ! l3 ! l4 ! l5 ! l6 ! l7. In contrast, the
captured user trajectory that starts at location l2 at time t1
consists of the sequence l2 ! l1 ! l2 ! l3 ! l4 !
l5 ! l6. To determine whether this is an expected or
anomalous user behavior, we compare the joint probability
of this path with the profile of the particular user. The
calculated value should be equal to or greater than the trust
value for that user.
To calculate the captured trajectory joint probability P0SWm
as indicated in Eq. 5, we first identify the starting point




indicate trajectory probability which is used to perform the
anomaly detection process, and P0Sm to refer to sample
probability which is used for the calculation of P0trust value).
Then, we check whether lj 2 UCLi or not. If not, we increase
the threat level TL value by one. Otherwise, we identify this
location, lj as the starting location, and check the value LOC-
TIME-MOVEi(tk, lj, lj) to calculate the trace joint probability
value P0SWm . Next step is to identify the next record, and read
the data lj0 and tk0 from that record. If lj0 2 UCLi, we obtain
the weighted probability value LOC-TIME-MOVEiðtk; lj0 ; ljÞ.
If not, we increase the TL value again. This process is
repeated for the entire user trace and, upon completion, we
check whether TLTLtrust or not. If it is greater than TLtrust,
this trajectory is judged to have been generated by someone
other than the user, that is, an attacker. If not, we subse-
quently check the P0SWm value. If P
0
SWm
P0trusti , the trajectory
is judged to belong to the user; otherwise, it is treated as a
trajectory generated by an attacker.
4 Data reduction
We now aim to further improve the efficiency by reducing
the size of the user model, with low impact on the accuracy
of the attack detection. The reduction benefits are twofold:
1. reduce the amount of memory occupied by the user
model, and
2. reduce the CPU time required to perform the detection
process and therefore enhance the system performance.
The Reality Mining data set consists of 93 users with
total number of distinct locations is in the range 3–100, and
average of 28 locations. While the Geolife data set has 65
users with total number of distinct locations 134–1,200.
For these data sets, the user profile requires up to





Fig. 9 User path analysis
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and up to (1,440 9 1,200 9 1,200) & 109 memory loca-
tions for Model #2. We propose and analyze two different
solutions to reduce the size of the models’ representations:
1. The first is called the Row-Merge algorithm, where the
rows in the user model table LOC-IN-TIMEi are
combined if they fit this condition: For each tk 2 NT :
8lj 2 UCLi ðCount LOC-IN-TIMEiðtk; ljÞ 6¼ 0Þ ThV;
ð6Þ
where ThV is a threshold value that guarantees no detec-
tion degradation occurs due to the Row-Merge process.
2. The second algorithm is based on the MDLP (Minimal
Description Length Principle) [3, 18].
We now present in detail the algorithms along with their
complexity analysis.
4.1 Row-Merge algorithm
As discussed in Sect. 3.1, three properties identify a profile:
– At any minute tk, user ui can exist in any location lj
identified in the Li list.
– At any minute tk, each user ui has to be located in one of
the locations lj that are identified in the distinct locations
list Li. Yet, by considering the UCLi list rather than the Li
list, our user profile will have certain time of the day that
is not accounted for therefore the new rule is as follows:
8lj 2 IFi; 9 tk where Probiðtk; ljÞ ¼ 0:
– Based on Model #1, the sum of all the probability






LOC-IN-TIMEiðtk; ljÞ ¼ 1:
Observation: Although there is no rule preventing a user
from being at any place at any time, the patterns indicated
different findings. The user profile shows that at a certain
time of the day (late night to early morning for example),
some users are always at one place, and the probability
value for the rest of locations equals zero.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of the time the user
spends in each location every day, and it indicates that each
user has only few locations that he spends most of the time
at. For instance, although user u12 has 13 distinct locations
in his profile, there are only three locations u12 visits every
day (l2, l8, l9). Similarly, user u37 has 51 distinct locations
in UCL37, while he spends most of his time in seven
locations (l1, l6, l9, l19, l25, l28, l50).
Based on the above observation, we conclude that if we
consolidated the time periods where a given user has been
in few locations (less than ThV) into one row, we could
significantly reduce the size of the matrix representing that
user’s profile. The main idea is to consolidate consecutive
rows where the total number of LOC-IN-TIMEi(tk,lj) = 0 in
that row is less than ThV. The Row-Merge approach is
formalized by Algorithm 2.
The data input is the user profile consisting of NT rows










































User 37 Location - Time Distribution
Fig. 10 The average number of minutes per day the user spent in
each location
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reduced number of rows RN and |UCLi| columns. The first
step is to read the user profile. For each row, we count the
total number of cells that are greater than zero as illustrated
in Line 11. If the count is less than the threshold value ThV,
then this row will be merged with the previous one in the
LOC-IN-TIMEi table as shown in Line 13. If the count of
probability values that are greater than zero is greater than
ThV, we keep this row and update the Time_Indexi as
shown in Lines 15–21. Upon completion, we initialize the
Reduced_Model_Data(RMDi) with the new number of
rows as shown in Line 24 and save the new user model in
this matrix as illustrated in Lines 26–30. The complexity of
this algorithm is O(NT 9 |UCLi|).
As an example, assume that Fig. 11 represents a user
profile for user ui with eight distinct locations l1; l2; . . .; l8.
The size of this user profile is 1,440 9 8 = 11,520
numeric values. In this example, we illustrate the Row-
Merge process for a threshold value ThV = 1 which indi-
cates that all rows in the user profile that have at most one
probability value that is greater than zero will be merged
with the previous row. Figure 12 details this process.
The total reduction in the matrix size is equal to the total
eliminated rows (1,440 - Q) multiplied by 8, the total
number of distinct location.
4.2 MDLP algorithm
In this section, we aim to compress the size of the user model
by applying the Minimum Description Length Principle
(MDLP), based on the following insight: any regularity in
the data can be used to compress the data, that is, to describe
it using fewer symbols than the number of symbols needed to
describe the data literally. The more regularities there are,
the more the data can be compressed [15].
Observation: The challenge in this approach is to identify
regularity in our user model that is not completely regular;
there is no single subset LOC-IN-TIME00i in the user model
LOC-IN-TIMEi that we could identify as a hypothesis to
regenerate the user model. In fact, it is acceptable to assume




; . . .; LOC-IN-TIME00ir that
combined could be utilized to regenerate the user model
LOC-IN-TIMEi and therefore are used for model compres-
sion. On the other hand, we understand that there will always
be some regular data sets in our user model which we will not
be able to compress.
The Algorithm: The single user model for ui is LOC-IN-
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Fig. 12 Row-Merge process
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tk, and each column corresponds a user distinct location lj,
and each entry LOC-IN-TIMEi(tk, lj) records the probability
for the given user ui to visit the location lj at time tk. Given
this, we focus on the temporal regularity in this data set in
order to perform our user model compression. We would
like to find a function Hi that partitions the time into
consecutive intervals, based on user model matrix, and
minimizes the loss when combining/merging two rows.
To facilitate our discussion, we assume that we maintain
the row sum (Ri(k)) and the time frequency (Ti(k)), for each





and 8 records 2 model data:
TiðkÞ ¼ Record Count where ðtk1Þ\tk ðtkþ1Þ ð8Þ
The time frequency represents the number of records in the
data log that represents each time interval, for one minute
intervals.
Then, the function Hi(k) for each row in the user ui
profile is calculated as










Clearly, this resembles the well-known entropy—a
common measure for the information loss [15]. Combining
two consecutive rows k and k ? 1 and merge them into one
interval k, k ? 1, the cell value for each cell in the model is
LOC-IN-TIME0iðtk; ljÞ ¼ LOC-IN-TIMEiðtk; ljÞ
þ LOC-IN-TIMEiðtkþ1; ljÞ
and R0iðkÞ ¼ RiðkÞ þ Riðk þ 1Þ; therefore, the function
Hi(k, k ? 1) is calculated as








The information loss is measured by the difference
between the entropy when we combine two rows into one
and the combined weighted entropy sum from the two rows
TiðkÞHiðkÞþTiðkþ 1ÞHiðkþ 1Þ ðTiðkÞþTiðkþ 1ÞÞ
Hiðk;kþ 1Þþ ðjUCLij  1Þ logDS:
where (DS = |model_data| - RIFi) as calculated in Sect.
3.1.1.
Assuming that the matrix has NT rows and |UCLi| col-
umns, the complexity of the matrix model can be written as
(|UCLi| - 1) 9 logDS.
Given this, we can apply the MDLP (Minimal
Description Length Principle) which is the sum of the
model complexity and the overall entropy of the matrix
XNT
k¼1
½HiðkÞ  TiðkÞ þ ½ðjUCLij  1Þ  logDS: ð11Þ
A single greedy algorithm can simply choose the two
consecutive rows which can produce the smallest
information loss and then group them into one row. This
procedure can be performed until the overall MDLP
measure cannot decrease.
The MDLP algorithm has O(NT 9 |UCLi|) complexity.
Algorithm 3 formalizes this approach.
As an example, assume that Fig. 10 represents a user
profile for user ui with eight distinct locations 11; l2; . . .; 88.
The size of this user profile is 1,440 9 8 = 11,520
numeric values. In this example, we illustrate the MDLP
process, and Fig. 13 details this process as follows.
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– First, we initialize a Time_Indexi matrix.
– We calculate the Hi(k) value for each row k in the
database and save it in the Hmatrix.
– We run the MDLP algorithm against this user profile
starting with the first two rows t1 and t2. In this
example, Hi(1) = 0, Hi(2) = 1 and Hi(1,2) = 0.93.
– We calculate the information loss value:
Tið1Þ  Hið1Þ þ Tið2Þ  Hið2Þ  ðTið1Þ þ Tið2ÞÞ
 Hið1; 2Þ þ ½ðjUCLij  1Þ  logDS:
In this case, the information loss value is [ 0, which
indicates that we can combine these two rows together,
and subsequently the first row in the reduced matrix
will be
LOC-IN-TIMEiðt1; ljÞ ¼ LOC-IN-TIMEiðt1; ljÞ
þ LOC-IN-TIMEiðt2; ljÞ:
– We update both Hmatrix to have the Hi(1) = Hi(1,2),
the time frequency to have Ti(1) = Ti(1) ? Ti(2),
and the Time_Indexi matrix to have the first cell has
the value t2 to indicate that the first row in the
reduced user profile represents the minutes t1 and t2
of the day.
– We advance to the third row and examine the Hmatrix
values for the rows t1 and t3. In this case, Hi(1) = 0.93
and Hi(3) = 0 while Hi(1,3) = 0.81, and therefore,
Tið1Þ  Hið1Þ þ Tið3Þ  Hið3Þ  ðTið1Þ þ Tið3ÞÞ
 Hið1; 3Þ þ ½ðjUCLij  1Þ  logDS:
In this case, the value is less than zero, and we cannot
combine the rows.
– We repeat this process and scan the user profile row by
row until we achieve a matrix with Q0  8 values and a
Time_Indexi matrix with Q
0 values.
The total reduction in the matrix size is equal to the total
eliminated rows multiplied by the total number of distinct
locations ð1; 440  Q0Þ  8.
5 Experimental results
This section has two main parts. (1) We provide a
detailed evaluation for our attack detection algorithms.
We test our ability to build user profiles based on spa-
tio–temporal traces and to detect anomalous behavior
based on these profiles. We examine and compare the
test results for both methods explained in Sect. 2.1.2. (2)
We evaluate the effects of each data reduction algorithm
in terms of reducing the user profile size and illustrate
that this reduction has small impact on the detection
accuracy.
5.1 Anomaly detection results
As discussed in Sect. 2.1.2, we used the Reality Mining
[11] and Geolife mobility [38] traces for this evaluation.
Each user log was divided into two equal contiguous
data sets: training data set (model_data) and testing data set
(test_data) as described in Sect. 3.1. For each user, we
randomly selected 100 samples from the test_data log with
T duration. We repeated each test for four different T val-
ues (5, 15, 30, and 60 min). The T value is the detection
delay.
5.1.1 Results for Model #1
For each user, we constructed models and calculated trust
values Ptrust following the steps described in Sect. 3.1.
Attacker behavior traces are not presently available.
However, traces for different users are available.
In our previous study [35], we explained the detailed
results based on the Reality Mining data set where we
demonstrated that the Model #1 of our system is capable of
detecting an attack with a 94.4 % accuracy rate within
15 min as shown in Fig. 14. This figure indicates that in case
of theft, our system has 94.4 % chance of notifying the
device owner of the theft within 15 min and 92.0 % chance
of notifying the device owner of the theft within 5 min.
In this study, we evaluate the system’s ability to perform
attack detection based on the Geolife data set. In Sect. 3,
we have indicated that we have limited our user locations
to an area of (138 9 110) miles, and we mapped each
(7 9 8) meter to an area ID based on a (±0.0001)
change in each coordinate. Based on this information, and
after eliminating all the records that do not fit within the
Beijing area, we had a total 65 users with 100–1,200 dis-
tinct locations. The average was 780 distinct locations. We
mapped these locations into area IDs (1–1,200).
Looking closer at the available location data, we notice
a big difference among users and their trajectories.
Figure 15 shows four different randomly selected users
with their respective location histograms. This figure
indicates that individuals tend not to travel very far, and
when they do, they do not stay long. Although few users
share some area IDs, the percentage of them visiting these
areas is different, and the time of the day for these visits is
different too. We reported similar observations for the
Reality Mining data set [35].
Our test results with regard to accuracy exhibit also
similar patterns. We were able to achieve a 95.6 % accu-
racy detection rate when T = 5 min and 93.8 % accuracy
rate when T = 15 min as shown in Fig. 16. We notice that
the detection accuracy for the 5-min delay is better in the
Geolife than the 15-min detection delay. We can correlate
this to the fact that this data set did not have many long
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Fig. 13 MDLP reduction
process
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time sequences to use as a test sequence, which resulted in
a decline in the detection accuracy associated with the
longer delay. On the other hand, the granularity of the
location information is finer for the Geolife than the Reality
Mining data set, which also contributes to a higher detec-
tion rate for smaller values of T.
5.1.2 Results of Model #2
We followed the same steps described in [35] to calculate
the FAR0 values based on Model # 2 user profile and
probability analysis. We demonstrated in that study based










































Fig. 14 Accuracy in anomaly
detecting and standard deviation
results in relation to trajectory
size based on Model #1 and
Reality Mining data set
Fig. 15 Distinct location histogram for the Geolife data set. a user 20, b user 62, c user 123, d user 170
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detecting an attack with a 96.13 % accuracy rate within
15 min as shown in Fig. 17.
The Geolife data set allowed high detection accuracy
too as shown in Fig. 18. The detection accuracy range
was 96.0–90.5 %. Lower P0trust values are associated with
the longer traces, which indicates that it is uncommon
for most users to make large day-to-day changes in
motion patterns affecting short intervals within a trace.
However, longer intervals are more likely to change
from day to day.
5.1.3 Model comparison
As illustrated in Figs. 14, 16, 17, and 18, the average
accuracy is slightly better for Model #2 than for Model #1
for small sample intervals (less than 30 min)—but the
standard deviation is significantly better in the Reality
Mining data set, while the improvement is slightly there for
the ‘‘Geolife’’ data set.
However, the cost of obtaining this small improvement in
accuracy (B2 %) for T = 15 min is expensive, consider-
ing the required memory to store the user profile: (NT 9
|UCLi|) for Model #1, and (NT 9 |UCLi| 9 |UCLi|) for
Model #2, along with the respective time complexity for
anomaly detection O(TS 9 NT 9 |UCLi|) for Model #1
and O(TS 9 NT 9 |UCLi| 9 |UCLi|) for Model #2.
Therefore, our recommendation for this data set is to use
Model #1 approach to achieve a high detection accuracy with
lower memory requirements.
The simplicity of the resulting user models resulted in
an efficient anomaly detection process supporting an
average detection time 0.02 seconds, as shown in Fig. 19.
A comparison between our results and those of existing












































Fig. 16 Accuracy in anomaly
detecting and standard deviation
results in relation to trajectory











































Fig. 17 Accuracy in anomaly
detecting and standard deviation
results in relation to trajectory
size based on Model #2 and












































Fig. 18 Accuracy in anomaly
detecting and standard deviation
results in relation to trajectory
size based on Model #2 and
Geolife data set
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5.2 Reduction results
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the Matrix
Reduction methods based on running both the Row-Merge
algorithm and the MDLP algorithm. Our evaluation is
based on the user profiles built in the previous sections.
Efficiency evaluation includes
1. reduction rate,
2. detection accuracy in relation to the reduced profile,
3. algorithm complexity, and
4. elapsed time required to perform the reduction process.
5.2.1 Row-Merge algorithm
Processing the Row-Merge matrix reduction algorithm for
all the users’ profiles in both data sets when ThV = 1 has
shown an inconsistent reduction rate among the users.
Figure 20 shows these results based on the Reality Mining
data set. The reduction rate is high for the profiles with few
distinct locations (\5), while it is low for the user profiles
with more than five distinct locations. Yet, after performing
the detection attack as described in Sect. 3.1, we noticed
that the detection accuracy has not been impacted nega-
tively, which is not surprising based on the analysis pro-
vided in the example in Sect. 4.1. Figure 21 illustrates the
detection accuracy for all users based on the reduced user
profile data when ThV = 1.
To further improve the reduction rate, we decided to
explore the possibility of consolidating the rows that rep-
resent tk where ThV [ 1. For each user ui, we examined
several values for ThV ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; . . .; = jUCLij
3
. The
changes of the ThV value have improved the reduction rate
and did not have a nominal negative impact on the detec-
tion accuracy. ThV ¼ jUCLij
3
produced the best results,
where we have seen consistent reduction rate and high
detection accuracy.
5.2.2 MDLP algorithm
Processing the MDLP matrix reduction algorithm for the
same users’ profiles has shown a consistent reduction
rate among all users as shown in Fig. 22 based on the
Reality Mining data set. The total number of distinct
locations had no effect on the reduction rate. In addition,
Fig. 19 Anomaly detection elapsed time according to sample interval
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Fig. 20 The reduction percentage based on the number of distinct
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Fig. 22 The reduction percentage based on the number of distinct
location in the profile based on the MDLP algorithm
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the detection accuracy rate has not been impacted neg-
atively (less than 1 % decrease in detection accuracy) as
shown in Fig. 23.
We notice that the reduction rate for the MDLP algo-
rithm is in the range (67.6–99.5 %) with an average of
87.6 %. This reduction came at a cost of only 1 % reduc-
tion in detection accuracy.
As we have indicated previously, these results are
expected since users spend most of their times in a few
locations, and they repeatedly visit these locations.
5.2.3 Row-Merge algorithm versus MDLP algorithm
In the previous subsections, we have illustrated that these
two algorithms provide comparable data reduction per-
centages, in addition to a comparable detection accuracy
rates as shown in Fig. 24. This figure shows the reduc-
tion rate and the detection accuracy based on the
reduction algorithms for both the Reality Mining data set
and the Geolife data set. We notice that the Row-Merge
algorithm reduction rate is related to the ThV value, for
example, when ThV = 1 the reduction rate average was
as low as 34.5 % for Reality Mining data set, while it
was 0.069 % for the Geolife data set. This rate has
improved with the increase of the ThV value where the
reduction rate reached the 91 % for the Reality Mining




. The main reason for this difference in
the reduction rate between the two data sets is the
number of distinct locations associated with each user;




. Similar results were achieved by the
MDLP, which performed very well on both data sets.
Regardless of the reduction rate, the detection accuracy
rate was not affected significantly after data reduction for
both algorithms and data sets. Therefore, it is hard to
compare these two algorithms based on the reduction rate
and the detection accuracy only.
Upon examining the algorithm time complexity, we
noticed that both algorithms have O(NT 9 |UCLi|)
complexity. However, the MDLP algorithm has higher
overhead because it accesses the user model several
times for every reduction process; the first time to cal-
culate the H function values, the second time to perform
a first round of reduction, the third time to perform a
second round, and if needed, forth and fifth time. On the
other hand, the Row-Merge algorithm goes over the user
model only one time and performs the reduction. In
addition, the Row-Merge algorithm performs a simple
comparison at every row with for the total number of
nonzero values in the row with a pre-defined value ThV,
and based on the results, the algorithm either merges the
rows for reduction or skip to the next row. This simple
logic makes the Row-Merge algorithm more efficient
than the MDLP algorithm that required double the time
to obtain the same reduction rate, and similar accuracy
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Fig. 24 A comparison of the reduction rate and detection accuracy
results based on different ThV values for the Row-Merge algorithm
and the MDLP algorithm
Fig. 25 The elapsed time to perform the matrix reduction process
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6 Related work
Spatio–temporal data management and efficient query
processing techniques have been the topics of intensive
research in the field of Moving Objects Databases [16]. In
particular, trajectory analysis and similarity detection have
yielded numerous research results in the recent years [9,
13, 22]. Several results from this arena have goals similar
to ours. For example, Mouza and Rigaux [10] propose
regular expression-based algorithms for detecting mobility
patterns. However, those patterns do not explicitly model
the temporal dimension of the motion, that is, the focus is
more on routes than trajectories.
In order to improve application awareness during tra-
jectory data analysis, Alvares et al. [2] proposed adding
semantic information during trajectory preprocessing.
Hung et al. [20] proposed the complementary approach of
using a probabilistic suffix tree to measure separation
among users trajectories. Xie et al. [32] addressed the
problem of predicting social activities based on users’
trajectories. In addition, Trestian et al. [30] used associa-
tion rule mining to investigate the relationships between
geographic locations and user habits for mobile devices.
Detecting malware in mobile devices usage is a topic
that has been tackled via various formalism. Using tem-
poral logic of causal knowledge as language, malicious
behavior signatures were proposed by Bose et al. [5] for
mobile devices running Symbian OS. A complementary
approach based on diffusion over bipartite graphs was
presented by Alpcan et al. [1], and another approach that
studies Bayesian networks, RBF, KNN, and random forest
is presented by Damopoulos et al. [8]. Fraud detection
based on usage behavior has also been addressed [6], where
the underlying classifier is based on artificial neural net-
works. While in our earlier work [34], we attempted to use
file-access patterns to detect malicious use; in this work,
our focus was on detecting deviations from individual
spatio–temporal patterns.
A cloud-based framework to detect intrusions and to
provide fast response for the mobile device is introduced
by Houmansadr et al. [19]. Their goal is complementary to
our approach of enabling the mobile devices themselves to
detect a potential theft by comparing user’s trajectories.
Sun et al. [29] proposed mobile intrusion detection
based on the Lempel–Ziv compression algorithm and
Markov Chains. The proposed technique used three-level
Markov Chains and did not consider the association
between time of the day and the location. Their ability to
detect attack using the proposed technique is limited to the
times at which the user is making phone calls and moving
faster than 60 miles per hour. Yan et al. [33] improved on
this work, yet the delay in detecting attack was 24 h, since
the traces were obtained once a day, with a sampling period
of 30 min. Our technique has an attack detection latency of
15 min. Hall et al. [17] proposed an intrusion detection
method based on mobility traces. Their focus was on public
transportation traces in which the paths are pre-defined.
7 Concluding remarks
We presented an approach for detecting anomalous use of
mobile devices. Our system uses spatio–temporal mobility
data to build models that have high anomaly detection
accuracy. Combining the spatio–temporal model (for users
with few locations) and trajectory-based model (for users
with many locations) allowed an average attack detection
rate of 94.48 % for Model #1 and 96.13 % for Model #2,
with a detection latency of 15 min. To further improve the
efficiency of this system, we applied a couple of data
reduction algorithms (Row-Merge, MDLP), which enabled
us to obtain high reduction rate while still capable of
detecting attacks with a 94 % accuracy.
One possible extension is to enrich the model by
allowing nonzero probabilities to capture the cases of the
owner visiting new locations. In addition, we would like to
investigate the quality of accuracy, along with other trade-
offs that may be involved when our approach is dealing
with prolonged disconnections from a server. We also plan
to expand this study to incorporate/couple different context
dimensions (e.g., call-patterns and application logs) in
order to improve the detection accuracy.
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